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ONLINE DEFAMATION RECOURSE 
 
by   
  




     This article discusses the law of defamation (particularly the 
form of written defamation known as libel), the various types 
of online sites where libel could occur and the available 
recourse or remedies for the person who was libeled online. 
  
II. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 
 
     The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558 provides the 
following elements for defamation: “to create liability for 
defamation there must be:  
(a)  a false and defamatory statement concerning 
another;  
(b)  an unprivileged publication to a third party;  
(c)  fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of 
the publisher; and  
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(d)  either actionability of the statement irrespective of 
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by 
the publication.”1.     
  
      The first element of defamation requires the that the 
statement must be a statement of fact and not opinion. It can be 
very difficult to sort out whether a statement is a statement of 
fact or opinion. “In determining whether a statement is merely 
an opinion and thus not subject to a cause of action for 
defamation as a matter of law, courts must take several 
considerations into account: "whether the statement has a 
precise and readily understood meaning; whether the statement 
is verifiable; and whether the statement's literary or social 
context signals that it has factual content."”2 
 
 The second element of defamation is publication to a 
third party. In the internet context, this is usually not a problem 
since the statement is typically published to at least one third 
person or available for anyone on the internet to see. 
     The third element of defamation involves the degree of 
liability. The notes for the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 558 provides that this was added as a result of the US 
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions. 3  The most famous 
case is New York Times Co. v Sullivan.4 In that case, the US 
Supreme Court held that in defamation actions by a public 
official, more than negligence is required and the plaintiff must 
prove actual malice which is that the statement was made with 
knowledge it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.5 Subsequently, the US Supreme Court extended this 
protection to “public figures”.6 In addition, there may be public 
figures for all purposes or public figures for a limited range of 
issues such a particular newsworthy event. 




     The fourth requirement element of defamation involves 
whether damage was proved or is assumed.  There are two kinds 
of defamation: defamation per se; and defamation per quod. “A 
statement is defamatory per se if the resulting harm is apparent 
and obvious on the face of the statement ….If a statement is 
defamatory per se, the plaintiff is not required to plead actual 
damage to his reputation ….but, rather, the statement is 
considered to be so obviously and materially harmful that injury 
to the plaintiff's reputation is presumed. …. There are five 
categories of statements that are deemed to be defamation per 
se: (1) words imputing the commission of a criminal offense; (2) 
words that impute infections with a loathsome communicable 
disease; (3) words that impute an individual is unable to perform 
his employment duties or otherwise lacks integrity in performing 
those duties; (4) words that prejudice an individual in his 
profession or otherwise impute a lack of ability in his profession; 
and (5) words that impute an individual has engaged in 
fornication or adultery.”7 “Statements are defamatory per quod 
where either: (1) the statement's defamatory character is not 
apparent on its face so that examining extrinsic circumstances is 
necessary to show its injurious meaning; or (2) the statement is 
defamatory on its face but does not fall within the enumerated 
categories of per se actions. Prejudice is not presumed, however, 
and the plaintiff must plead special damages.”8 If a statement is 
not defamatory per se, it is defamatory per quod and the plaintiff 
must prove actual monetary damages. 
     The last item to mention is the category of the party 
who disseminated the defamation. Common law distinguished 
among three different types of liability regarding defamation: 
publisher liability, distributor liability, and common carrier 
liability. “Publishers generally experience the greatest amount 
of liability, while common carriers experience the least. 
Publisher liability may be attributed to any entity that exercises 
a high degree of editorial content control over the dissemination 




of defamatory material. …Distributor liability may be attributed 
to any entity that distributes, but does not exercise editorial 
control over, defamatory material, such as a news vendor, 
bookstore, or library. A distributor can be characterized as an 
entity that transmits or delivers information that is created or 
published by a third party. Distributors are only held liable if 
they knew or had reason to know of the defamation. Lastly, 
common carrier liability applies to any entity that acts as a 
passive conduit for the transmission of defamatory material. 
Thus, even if it knew or had reason to know of the defamation, 
it may escape liability for defamation due to its lack of editorial 
control over the material.”9 
 
 
III. DIFFERENT TYPES OF INTERNET 
COMMUNICATION 
 
     There are many ways in which a person could be defamed 
in internet communications. Email is the first of those ways. A 
party would access his or her email through an internet service 
provider (“ISP”). An email would be sent to at least one other 
person. In addition, copies of the email could be sent to one or 
more than one other persons. All these communications should 
have at least the email address of the sender.  
 
      Instant messaging (“IM”) is another mode of internet 
communication. This is similar to an email. Again, the party 
sending the IM would access go through an ISP or similar 
carrier. Typically, there may not another person copied on the 
IM. As with an email, there should be some number identifying 
the sender. 
 




      The third mode of internet communication is a blog, 
chatroom or forum. Typically, a party would access these 
forums through an ISP. However, there usually is another party 
involved in setting up the blog, chatroom or forum. Anyone 
can contribute to these sites gaining access to them though an 
ISP. Anyone having access to the blog, chatroom or forum can 
see the defamatory communication. Many parties may use 
another name and it may be difficult for anyone reading these 
comments to identify the contributor without obtaining 
information from the provider. 
 
      Another way to communicate via the internet is 
through social media. This category has sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, LinkedIn and even other rating 
sites such as Yelp. Just like the previous category, usually 
someone is the provider and an individual then contributes 
comments to locations on the site gaining access through an 
ISP. Some of these such as Facebook and LinkedIn, may 
identify the person making a communication. Others, such as 
Yelp, may be like the previous category and it may be hard to 
identify the contributor. 
 
     Lastly, a party may find many sites on the internet by 
using search engine. There are many search engines such as 
Google and Bing. These search engines list various sites 
resulting from the search. There usually are excerpts taken 
from each actual site listed in the search results. A party would 











IV. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND 
INTERNET PUBLISHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS 
 
     Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of 
199610 (“CDA”) provides as follows:  
“(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access 
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict 
access to material described in paragraph (1) [subparagraph 
(A)].” 
 
     Section 230(f) of the CDA provides the following key 
definitions: 
“(2) Interactive computer service. The term “interactive 
computer service” means any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions. 
(3) Information content provider. The term “information 
content provider” means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.” 




     The first quoted subsection of 230(c) above provides that a 
provider or user is not considered to be a publisher for content 
provided by an information content provider. The second 
subsection of Section 230(c) above provides that no provider or 
user of an interactive computer service is liable for restricting 
access to certain content the provider or user considers 
objectionable. 
  
     There have been numerous actions brought against 
providers or platforms for online defamation. Many of the 
providers or platforms who have been sued have raised the 
defense that Section 230 of the CDA makes them immune from 
any liability. One of the most famous and early cases was the 
case of Zeran v America Online11. The plaintiff Zeran was the 
victim of a vicious online prank. An unknown person put 
Zeran’s name and telephone number in several notices on the 
electronic bulletin board of the defendant, America Online 
(“AOL”) advertising T-shirts with slogans glorifying the 
bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. After these 
were posted, Zeran received numerous troubling and 
threatening telephone calls. Zeran notified AOL of these posts 
and demanded their removal. After AOL removed the first 
posts, other similar posts again appeared, and the process of 
notice and eventual removal again occurred. Zeran sued AOL 
claiming AOL was negligent for allowing these notices to 
remain and reappear. Specifically, Zeran claimed AOL was the 
distributor of the defamatory material and while publishers are 
immune under Section 230 of the CDA, distributors are not. 
The court held that Section 230 of the CDA preempted state 
law, a distributor is merely a subset of a publisher under that 
statute and AOL was immune from suit. 
 
     Other cases have also held that internet publishers and 
distributors are not liable. In Schneider v Amazon.com, Inc.12, 
the plaintiff sued Amazon.com for alleged defamatory 




comments posted about the plaintiff’s book on Amazon’s 
website. The court held that to have Section 230 immunity, the 
following three elements are required: the defendant must be a 
provider or user of an “interactive computer service”; the 
asserted claims must treat the defendant as the publisher or 
speaker; and the information must be provided by another 
“information content provider”.13 If the defendant was the 
information content provider, then the defendant would not be 
immune and would be held liable. The court found all three 
elements were present in that case so Amazon was not liable. 
 
     AOL was again sued in Blumenthal v Drudge14. The 
Drudge Report, hosted on AOL’s website, had alleged 
defamatory statements about the plaintiff. Even though AOL 
had given Drudge a license agreement and even though under 
that license agreement, AOL could remove content that 
violated AOL’s terms of service, the court held that AOL was a 
publisher, was not the information content provider and 
therefore was not liable. In yet another case against AOL15, the 
court held AOL was not an information content provider for 
stock quotation information provided by two third parties even 
though AOL deleted some of the stock symbols. 
 
     In Reit v Yelp!, Inc.16, the plaintiff dentist contacted the 
defendant Yelp to remove a derogatory post about the 
plaintiff’s dental practice. After that contact, the plaintiff 
alleged that Yelp removed all 10 positive reviews and retained 
only the negative posting. The court held that if even Yelp’s 
action was true, it did not make Yelp the information content 
provider and Yelp was immune under Section 230. 
 
     In Klayman v Zuckerberg17, the alleged defamatory material 
was an anti-Semitic post on Facebook. The plaintiff demanded 
that Facebook remove the page from Facebook which it 
eventually did. The plaintiff claimed Facebook’s conduct did 




not arise from its being a publisher but rather from Facebook’s 
contractual obligations in its Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities. The court held that under Section 230, 
Facebook and its founder Mark Zuckerberg were immune. 
 
     As a result of Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act as interpreted by all these cases, providers or platforms are 
not liable for defamatory posts unless the platform itself 
created the content. It does not matter whether these platforms 
are publishers or distributors. Therefore, there is a difference 
between merely hosting a platform and providing content on 
that platform. Of course, the providers and platforms are 
known and are the deep pockets to sue for any online 
defamation. The internet service providers themselves are not 
liable either. 
 
     There are a few cases which hold that Section 230 did not 
bar recovery where the providers did contribute to the 
questionable content.  In Carafano v Metrosplash, Inc.18, the 
defendant was an information service that provided or enabled 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server. 
Through the internet, thousands of members were able to 
access and use a searchable database maintained on the 
service's computer servers. The court held that the service was 
also an "information content provider," as users of the service's 
website did not simply post whatever information they desired, 
but a profile was created from questions asked by the service 
and the answers provided and therefore, the service was not 
immune under Section 230. In Hy Cite Corp. v 
Badbusinessbureau19, the defendant’s operators' website 
allowed users to post and view complaints, so-called "rip-off-
reports," about businesses. The plaintiff, among other things, 
alleged that the website included 35 reports involving its 
business and those reports contained false and defamatory 
statements. Among other things,  the court held that  the 




operators were not entitled to immunity under Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act because the manufacturer's 
allegations (that the operators produced original content 
contained in the ripoff reports and solicited individuals to 
submit reports with the promise that they might ultimately be 
compensated) were sufficient to support a finding that the 





V. OTHER RECOURSE FOR ONLINE DEFAMATION 
 
     If the party defamed online cannot sue the provider or 
platform for the defamatory material, what other remedies does 
the party have? 
      
 
Unmasking the Identity of an Anonymous Online Defamer 
 
 
 A party who is defamed has the right to sue the party 
who posted the defamatory material. With some forms of 
online communication (such as email, instant messaging, posts 
on a known person’s Facebook page and tweets by a known 
person) the identity of the party who made the defamatory 
statement might be known or could be easily identified. 
However, the identity of a party posting defamatory material 
on blogs, chatrooms, forums, ratings sites and some social 
media may not be known. So how does the defamed party find 
out the identity of the party who posted the defamatory 
content? Usually, the ISP or the platform that hosted these 
vehicles probably has some information or can easily find out 
information about the identity of the defamer.  




In the appellate case of John Doe No.1 v Cahill20,  the  
allegedly defamed party sought to obtain the identity of the 
defamer from the ISP. The appellant (the alleged defamer) , 
using an alias, had posted two statements on an internet website 
sponsored by a news agency stating the appellee councilman 
(the alleged defamed party) was paranoid, full of character flaws 
and had mental deterioration. The appellee obtained an order 
requiring the ISP, Comcast, to disclose the identity of the 
appellant. The appellant appealed from the lower court order.  
The Supreme Court of Delaware looked at the appropriate 
standard of proof required in a motion to dismiss the case 
considering the First Amendment right to speak anonymously. 
The court adopted the standard of the New Jersey appellate court 
in Dendrite Intl., Inc. v Doe21. The court in Dendrite put forth a 
test that had four parts requiring the party seeking disclosure: 
“(1) to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous poster that he 
is the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of 
disclosure, and to withhold action to afford the anonymous 
defendant a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition 
to the application. In the internet context, the plaintiff's efforts 
should include posting a message of notification of the discovery 
request to the anonymous defendant on the same message board 
as the original allegedly defamatory posting; (2) to set forth the 
exact statements purportedly made by the anonymous poster that 
the plaintiff alleges constitute defamatory speech; and (3) to 
satisfy the prima facie or "summary judgment standard."22 After 
the court concluded a plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause 
of action, the court must “(4) balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength 
of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the 
disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity in determining 
whether to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”23 The court 
in Cahill held that the second and fourth prongs of the Dendrite 
test were not necessary. Since prong number 1 had occurred, the 
court looked at prong three of the Dendrite test. The court held 




that under the summary judgement standard, no reasonable 
person would believe the appellant’s statements had stated facts 
about the appellee.  
 The Maryland Court of Appeals in the case of 
Independent Newspapers, Inc. v Brodie24 applied the Dendrite 
and Cahill standards as well as discussing two other cases with 
different standards. The first other case mentioned in Brodie was 
Columbia Insurance Company v Seecandy.com25, which had the 
following test: “First, the plaintiff should identify the missing 
party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can 
determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be 
sued in federal court. This requirement is necessary to ensure 
that federal requirements of jurisdiction and justiciability can be 
satisfied. Second, the party should identify all previous steps 
taken to locate the elusive defendant. This element is aimed at 
ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply with 
the requirements of service of process and specifically 
identifying defendants. Third, plaintiff should establish to the 
Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could 
withstand a motion to dismiss. A conclusory pleading will never 
be enough to satisfy this element. Pre-service discovery is akin 
to the process used during criminal investigations to obtain 
warrants. The requirement that the government show probable 
cause is, in part, a protection against the misuse of ex parte 
procedures to invade the privacy of one who has done no wrong. 
A similar requirement is necessary here to prevent abuse of this 
extraordinary application of the discovery process and to ensure 
that plaintiff has standing to pursue an action against defendant. 
Lastly, the plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the 
Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific 
discovery requested as well as identification of a limited number 
of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be 
served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
discovery process will lead to identifying information about 




defendant that would make service of process possible.”26 Also, 
the second other case mentioned in Brodie was In Re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.27, where the Circuit Court 
of Virginia court put forth  the lowest standard which only 
required that the party seeking the identity have a good faith 
basis  for asserting a cause of action before permitting discovery 
of identifying information. The court in Brodie ended up 
adopting the Dendrite standard and ordered the lower court to 
grant the protective order/motion to quash preventing disclosure 
of the identifying information. 
     The Illinois Appellate Court in Maxon v Ottawa Publishing 
Company 28 ,  discussed Dendrite and Cahill but came to a 
different result. In Illinois, Supreme Court Rule 224 provides 
how a party can determine the identity of a party they may have 
a claim against. That Rule provides as follows: “(i) a person or 
entity who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purpose of 
ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in 
damages may file an independent action for such discovery.  (ii) 
The action for discovery shall be initiated by the filing of a 
verified petition in the circuit court of the county in which the 
action or proceeding might be brought or in which one or more 
of the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought resides. 
The petition shall set forth: (A) the reason the proposed 
discovery is necessary and (B) the nature of the discovery sought 
and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtain 
such discovery. The order allowing the petition will limit 
discovery to the identification of responsible persons.” 29The 
court held that this rule provided the appropriate standard and 
granted the petition for disclosure. 
     The Virginia Court of Appeals in Yelp, Inc. v Hadeed Carpet 
Cleaning, Inc. 30  stated that a Virginia has a statute which 
provides an unmasking standard. That statute provides as 
follows: “At least thirty days prior to the date on which 




disclosure is sought, a party seeking information identifying an 
anonymous communicator shall file with the appropriate circuit 
court a complete copy of the subpoena and all items annexed or 
incorporated therein, along with supporting material showing: a. 
That one or more communications that are or may be tortious or 
illegal have been made by the anonymous communicator, or that 
the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith 
basis to contend that such party is the victim of conduct 
actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was filed. A copy of 
the communications that are the subject of the action or 
subpoena shall be submitted.  b. That other reasonable efforts to 
identify the anonymous communicator have proven fruitless. c. 
That the identity of the anonymous communicator …. is …. 
needed to advance the claim, relates to a core claim or defense, 
or is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense. d. 
That no motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, or judgment as a matter of law, demurrer or summary 
judgment-type motion challenging the viability of the lawsuit of 
the underlying plaintiff is pending. The pendency of such a 
motion may be considered by the court in determining whether 
to enforce, suspend or strike the proposed disclosure obligation 
under the subpoena. e. That the individuals or entities to whom 
the subpoena is addressed are likely to have responsive 
information.”31 In that case, the appellate court stated there are 
at least nine standards for unmasking not including the standard 
in Virginia and including Columbia Insurance, Cahill, Brodie 
and Dendrite. The appellate court also upheld the order of the 
trial court enforcing a subpoena on Yelp to disclose the 
identifying information. 
     In summary, trying to find out the identity of the defamer 
from ISP’s, platforms or providers will depend upon the state in 
which the party is filing the proceeding. Some states require a 
much more substantial showing than the other states. 




Possible Actions Against the Provider 
 
     It is noteworthy that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act32 
does require that if providers or platforms receive a notice from 
a third party that a user has infringed on its intellectual property, 
the provider or platform must take action leading to the ultimate 
removal of the infringing material. Many of the terms and 
conditions of providers or platforms allow a request to take 
down material or give the provider or platform the right to 
remove material that the provider or platform consider to be 
objectionable. Facebook’s terms of service more or less provide 
a user with the ability to notify Facebook of defamatory material 
and certainly give Facebook the right to remove objectionable 
material.33 If a victim makes such a request of the provider or 
platform, the provider or platform may agree to remove the 
defamatory content. However, even if the defamatory post is 
removed from the site where it appeared, the defamatory post 
may still show up in internet searches using a search engine. To 
remove the defamatory material completely, the victim would 
need to get the search engines, such as Google or Bing, to 
remove it as well. This could be extremely difficult.  
     The case of Barnes v Yahoo!, Inc. 34  provides a possible 
recourse concerning a provider’s agreement to remove 
objectionable content and the failure to do so. In that case, a 
former boyfriend of the plaintiff posted nude photographs and 
other sexually explicit content on Yahoo. The plaintiff requested 
Yahoo to remove the content, Yahoo agreed but did not do so. 
The plaintiff sued Yahoo alleging negligence and promissory 
estoppel. The court concluded that Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act barred the negligence claim but 
did not bar the promissory estoppel claim. So, such a claim is a 
possible recourse against a provider or platform if a defamed 




party requests removal, the provider or platform agrees and fails 
to do so. 
 
Possible Actions Against the Defamer 
 
      Some businesses have used a way to combat negative online 
comments using anti-disparagement clauses in their online 
agreements. “At present, the agreements take two forms…. In 
the first format, the customer agrees to a contract that prohibits 
[the customer] …. from making or posting any negative 
remarks, criticisms, or comments about a business, its goods or 
services. The second anti-disparagement clause involves 
transferring copyright ownership of any online review from the 
customer to the business.”35 Once this copyright ownership is 
transferred, the business can demand removal under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act noted above.  
     The case of Palmer v Klearegear.com36 involved the use of 
such a disparagement clause. The customer made statements 
about the defendant’s poor-quality customer service practices. 
The defendant levied a $3,500 fine against the plaintiff. When 
the plaintiff did not pay the fine, the defendant reported the 
unpaid fine to the credit bureau. The court found that this clause 
was unenforceable. Pursuant to the federal Consumer Review 
Fairness Act37 and many state laws, including California38, these 
clauses are unenforceable. 
     Another possible course of action is to respond to the content 
directly. A victim should carefully consider this option. The 
victim may end up in an online war with the perpetrator. Also, 
this action could further highlight the defamatory post.  




    CONCLUSION  
 
 
     Before the advent of the internet, the possibilities of being 
defamed occurred primarily in print media such as newspapers 
or magazines, but there were some journalistic standards 
exercised by the publishers. Now, there are much greater 
possibilities of being defamed online and there are fewer, if 
any, journalistic standards.  
 
  There are challenges with legal recourse for online 
defamation. The providers and platforms are mostly immune. 
Also, it may be difficult to unmask the identity of anonymous 
defamers through the providers or the ISP. Even if the 
defamatory content is removed, there still may be references to 
that content in searches performed by search engines. It is 
difficult to get those search engines to remove any reference to 
the content also. Other remedies such as the use of anti-
disparagement clauses by online businesses are unenforceable. 
Even if the defamers are identified and not immune, there can 
be difficulties proving the required elements of a defamation 
case. A comment could be deemed to be an unactionable 
opinion or the defamed party could be a limited public figure 
and would therefore have to show malice. Also, even if those 
defamers are unmasked, they may not have sufficient assets to 
satisfy any judgement. 
 
     The best possible outcome would be to amend the 
Communications Decency Act to have a similar notice and 
removal provision as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
Many authors have advocated that very change39. While the 
providers cannot be expected to police every posting on their 
sites, this notice and removal procedure would take into 




account the logistical dilemma of the providers while giving 
some recourse to the defamed parties as well.  
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